The question of how embedded actors can create institutions that support cluster emergence remains unsolved in the cluster and national innovation systems literature. The present paper extends the recent literature on institutional entrepreneurship and institutional work to solve this paradox of embedded agency in the context of science-based clusters. Building on a longitudinal single case study of a functional foods cluster in Finland, we present an institutional work framework for cluster formation. We argue that, in addition to ideational, material and bridging work, authentic leadership work is critical for cluster emergence. The results of the study highlight the opportunities that scientists have to act as midwives to cluster formation, but they also show that well-functioning clusters need a broader support base.
Introduction
The prosperity and dynamics of regions is increasingly connected to co-creation of knowledge between public and private actors in science-based clusters. Recent studies have suggested that while there is strong research focus on how clusters function, there is a noticeable disregard for how clusters actually become clusters (Menzel and Fornahl, 2009; Feldman and Lendel, 2010) . In analysing the origins of science-based clusters, the present study draws on neoinstitutional theory. The context of science is highly institutionalised, which makes it interesting to study little-documented practices through which actors engage in the disruption of institutions (Oliver, 1992; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) and the creation of new institutions to support cluster emergence.
Studies on clusters and national innovation systems have highlighted the important role which institutions that facilitate learning, knowledge sharing and identity building play in the fields form around common issues rather than technologies or industries, we show how a science-based cluster started to emerge around a pressing societal problem. We suggest that the original trigger for cluster emergence lies within the socio-cultural environment, which was framed as an issue by individual scientists acting as issue sponsors (Dutton, 1993) . Hence, we join those that have emphasised the criticality of a regions' capacity to detect problems and implement solutions that lead to the formation of new clusters (Parker, 2010) .
Theoretical Context: Institutional Agency and Cluster Emergence

Science as a Stage for Institutional Entrepreneurship
The institutional entrepreneurship literature suggests that new institutions arise when socially skilled actors with sufficient interest and resources see an opportunity to realise interests that they value highly (DiMaggio, 1988) . With a few exceptions (Jain and George, 2007; Ritvala and Granqvist, 2009) , the field of science has been neglected in the study of institutional entrepreneurship. Similarly, clusters and national innovation systems have been an undertheorised context of institutional entrepreneurship, with a few exceptions (Robinson et al., 2007; Hung and Whittington, 2011) . From Kuhn's (1962) perspective, institutional entrepreneurs are those that participate in paradigmatic changes and argue for new relevant research questions, how they should be investigated and how results should be interpreted. This requires strong institutional agency, given that science is a highly institutionalised area of human endeavour with established and embedded professional norms and practices. A lack of knowledge remains regarding how the activities of individual scientists acting as institutional entrepreneurs gain the momentum that enables cluster emergence.
Institutional Work in Cluster Formation
The concept of institutional work shifts attention away from the dramatic actions of "heroic" entrepreneurs in the institutional entrepreneurship literature to broaden the range of actors involved in influencing institutions (Lawrence et al., 2009; Riaz et al., 2011) . The collective aspect of institutional work is foundational to our study of cluster emergence, which requires the participation of diverse types of actors who transform institutions in the course of their everyday work. Although institutional work aims to affect the institutional order, it represents "a complex mé lange of forms of agency-successful and not, simultaneously radical and conservative, strategic and emotional, full of compromises, and rife with unintended consequences" (Lawrence et al., 2011: 52) . Despite broad insights regarding the multitude of forms of institutional work, there is only minimal understanding of why certain actors engage in institutional work while others do not (Lawrence et al., 2009; Riaz et al., 2011) . The institutional work framework for cluster formation that is developed below builds on the previous studies and our empirical case. It suggests the notion of authentic leadership to uncover the motivations and capacities needed to carry out institutional work in cluster emergence.
Institutional Work Framework for Cluster Formation
The institutional work framework for cluster formation highlights the role of institutional agency that individual scientists play in issue interpretation and solving, and in preparing the Scientists as Midwives to Cluster Emergence 479 ground for subsequent networking between actors in technological and business innovation. Figure 1 illustrates this framework. The starting point for the cluster formation process around societal problems is to identify a common issue (Hoffman, 1999; Atherton, 2003; Mytelka, 2006; Parker, 2010) . This is followed by issue interpretation and solving by scientists where they engage in four broad forms of institutional work: (1) issue framing and counterfactual thinking; (2) resource mobilisation; (3) bridging and networking; and (4) authentic leadership. While recent studies have identified the first three categories as central forms of institutional agency (Hung and Whittington, 2011; Tracey et al., 2011) , we suggest that authentic leadership is a fundamental driver and carrier of cluster development. In the context of science-based clusters, institutional work by scientists involves interaction with global epistemic communities and translation of knowledge-based ideas across spatial scales to make them fit local actors and institutions. During the cluster formation process, the forms of institutional work move towards increasing collaboration horizontally within and between industries, broader advocacy and education of new business and societal opportunities, as well as the construction of a new collective identity for the cluster (Romanelli and Khessina, 2005; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Arbuthnott et al., 2010) . However, cluster emergence is seldom a linear process; instead, it may involve discontinuities or "sticking points" (Atherton, 2003) when cluster participants are unprepared or unwilling to move to the next cluster stage. The next part of the paper discusses the four forms of institutional work further. 2.3.1 Issue framing and counterfactual thinking. Identification of common issues and crafting of related problems or opportunity-framing strategies are important acts for institutional entrepreneurs who aim to change the social structures in which they are embedded (Hung and Whittington, 2011; Tracey et al., 2011) . Frames are schemata of interpretation that guide individual or collective action by rendering events meaningful (Snow et al., 1986) . Skilful framing makes it possible to build a shared understanding of the problem (diagnostic framing), who or what is to be blamed (prognostic framing), and urge others to act in concert for issue solving (motivational framing) (Benford and Snow, 2000) . Framing involves theorisation; that is, the process whereby organisational failings are specified and linked to potential solutions (Greenwood et al., 2002) . In the context of societal issue solving, theorisation and motivational framing have been found to require counterfactual thinking-challenging assumptions, investigating underlying causes and generating proactive solutions (Tracey et al., 2011) . In the case of science-driven issues, scientists are typically the only legitimate actors to theorise causal relationships and possible solutions.
2.3.2 Resource mobilisation. One of the central tasks of an institutional entrepreneur is to find and secure sufficient resources-cognitive, social and material support-to change existing and to create new institutions. The existing literature uses terms such as leveraging (DiMaggio, 1988) , accumulating (Van de Ven and Garud, 1993), convening ( Westely and Vredenburg, 1997; Dorado, 2005) and aggregating (Hung and Whittington, 2011) , but scholars generally agree that resource mobilisation is a highly political and uncertain process (Fligstein, 1997) . In securing material support, scientists typically play a key role in building support infrastructure for clusters, such as major laboratories, and competencies, that shape future trajectories (Robinson et al., 2007) . They also mobilise support (material and nonmaterial) from a region's existing actors and industries (Arbuthnott et al., 2010) . Correspondingly, the support of scientists is needed to build markets around inventions within clusters, as markets require specific institutions and rules in order to come into existence ( North, 1990; Fligstein, 1997) .
Bridging and networking.
Research on institutional entrepreneurship has found that brokerage between dispersed ideas and actors is an essential element of entrepreneurial success (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006) , social problem solving (Maguire et al., 2004; Tracey et al., 2011) and the dynamics of spatial innovation systems (Arbuthnott et al., 2010; Hung and Whittington, 2011) . While bridging refers to more ideational work, networking implies social interaction, often between previously unconnected actors. The rules of membership define organisational fields (Lawrence, 1999) , which makes networking an important form of institutional work in cluster formation. Professionals with long histories in serving elites are uniquely positioned to act as brokers between social structures of hierarchy and status, and therefore act as key drivers of institutional change through advocacy (Suddaby and Viale, 2011) . As members of global epistemic communities, scientists are also well positioned to act as a bridge between spatial scales (Bunnell and Coe, 2001; Hå kanson, 2005) . While such "spatial work" is rarely discussed within neoinstitutional theory, economic geography increasingly stresses access to "global pipelines" or globally configured knowledge communities (Bathelt et al., 2004; Gertler and Levitte, 2005; Vang and Chaminade, 2007; Moodysson, 2008) .
Scientists as Midwives to Cluster Emergence 481 2.3.4 Authentic leadership. There is a rich body of literature suggesting the crucial role of individual scientists in path-creation processes of new technologies and high-tech regions. Typically, these accounts emphasise the role of a "star" scientist (Zucker et al., 2002) or an individual with high prestige and a vision-like Frederick Terman, the Provost of Stanford-in developing a region from its science base to a flourishing business region (Leslie and Kargon, 1996; Adams, 2005; Etzkowitz, 2006) . Similarly, the failure of clusters has been partially attributed to the lack of such entrepreneurial orientation to commercial application and focus on pure scientific programmes by scientists (Feldman et al., 2005) . Studies by Garud and Rappa (1994) and Garud and Ahlstrom (1997) emphasise that scientists must create and believe in their own realities in order to make progress in their chosen paths and convince others. This emphasises the role of authenticity; that is, the distinctive and truthful expression of identity to various audiences (Svejenova, 2005) .
The argument that authenticity is central for successful mobilisation can be found in the authentic leadership literature, which has roots in positive psychology (Luthans, 2002; Avolio and Gardner, 2005) . Authentic leaders have the ability to consider multiple sides of an issue, and have the positive psychological capacities of confidence, optimism, hope and resiliency (Avolio and Gardner, 2005) . They do not engage in leadership activities for status, honour or other personal rewards, but rather, they lead from a conviction (Shamir and Eilam, 2005) . While framing, resource mobilisation, bridging and networking are conscious and strategic activities, authentic leadership is more an unconscious activity and an enabling psychological capacity of individual institutional entrepreneurs.
Research Strategy
This paper follows a longitudinal single case study design, which suits our theory-building aim (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991) . This approach avoids temporal reductionism (Granovetter, 1992) , and responds to calls for longitudinal analysis to properly capture cluster emergence (Hå kanson, 2005) . We express what we see in the language of existing concepts and add our own observations (Pettigrew, 1997; Locke, 2007) . The study covers the theoretical middle range (Bourgeois, 1979; Chau and Witcher, 2005) in that we aim to understand cluster emergence in its unique context.
Context
This study focuses on cholesterol-lowering functional foods, where the active ingredient of plant stanol ester is added to block the absorption of so-called bad cholesterol (Miettinen et al., 1995) . A high level of blood cholesterol is a major risk factor for heart disease. We concentrate on one functional foods category, which came to symbolise the potential of functional foods. Yet, Finland's competence in functional foods extends beyond cholesterol lowering (e.g. dental health, wellbeing of the gastrointestinal tract and dietary fibre). Further, the aspiration to build functional foods clusters is a worldwide phenomenon, with significant resources being invested for instance in Saskatoon (Canada) and the Øresund region, around Malmö in Sweden and Copenhagen in Denmark (Lagnevik et al., 2003) .
Data Collection and Analysis
This study draws from three sources of data: interviews, participant observation and secondary data. In total, 35 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted. Informants included principal investigators of a heart health initiative called the North Karelia Project; senior firm management; professors of medicine, food chemistry and functional foods; and managers of cluster initiatives. The interview sessions lasted approximately two hours each. Interview themes covered (1) historical and recent developments in cluster emergence;
(2) the key actors and their roles and activities in the emergence process; and (3) the future of the cluster development. The main data collection phase took place between 2004 and 2008. Two additional post-study interviews took place in 2012 in order to engage the key field insiders in critical self-reflection and in the reflection of outcomes of cluster initiatives.
The second source of data is produced from participant observation, which was conducted between 2005 and 2008 in five separate networking events organised by the Finnish National Fund for Research and Development (SITRA) and the Finnish Export Organization Finpro. It complemented other data sources by enabling the observation of social intercourse, values and motivations of actors in their social context.
Thirdly, we relied on documents such as the evaluation reports of technology programmes and meeting memorandums to complement our understanding of the emerging cluster (e.g., Heasman, 1999; Lagnevik et al., 2003; Hernesniemi, 2004) .
Data analysis was an iterative process, following Langley's (1999) recommendations for process research. Initially, we built an event history database (Van de Ven and Poole, 1990) in which we collected key events and actors (Table 1 ). The aim was to trace back the roots of institutional change and scientific advancement that later triggered the cluster emergence. Three key phases were identified: the issue network that emerged in the province of North Karelia in the 1970s, the interdisciplinary innovation network in the late 1980s, and the publicly funded cluster initiatives since the late 1990s.
In the second stage, the three identified phases were re-examined with the help of tentative patterns that emerged from the data and theoretical concepts drawn from the literature. In the third stage, creativity and insight were harnessed in order to refine the different forms of institutional work that scientists were engaged in during cluster emergence. Our theorising process corresponds closely with the three interconnected processes identified by Langley (1999) : induction, deduction and inspiration driven by creativity.
Case Study: Institutional Work in the Functional Foods Cluster
Gestation Phase: Institutional Work to Change Food Habits for Improved Public Health, Early 1970s to Late 1980s
One of Finland's characteristics-and advantages-is that its companies work in a Silicon
Valley-type partnership with academia and government agencies [ . . . ] Many readers will have heard of the North Karelia project, a public health initiative dating back to the 1970s that set out to reduce the extremely high levels of heart disease in that region of Finland. This twenty-year focus on health has produced fertile ground for the development of a Finnish nutrition industry.-Industry analyst Dr Julian Mellentin (2003: 1) Scientists as Midwives to Cluster Emergence 483 In the 1960s, the mortality rate from heart disease in North Karelia in Eastern Finland was the highest in the world (Puska, 2008) . After World War II, people adopted the habits of eating fatty foods and heavy smoking, leading to a peak in heart disease. In January 1971, local politicians and civil society leaders signed a petition for urgent state aid. The North Karelia Project was launched in 1972 by Finnish authorities and experts, with the help of the World Health Organization (WHO). The aims of the North Karelia Project were to improve the detection and control of hypertension, to reduce smoking and to promote diets that were lower in saturated fat and higher in vegetables and low-fat products (McAlister et al., 1982) . Meeting these aims necessitated the creation of a radically new community intervention approach and strong long-term leadership.
4.1.2 Issue framing and counterfactual thinking in "shotgun prevention". The common belief in medical circles at the start of the North Karelia Project was that the success of any heart disease prevention attempt is uncertain at best. Indeed, the concept of community-based prevention was new and lacked legitimacy among cardiologists. It raised both ideological questions (the ethics of influencing people's dietary habits) and methodological ones (addressing the whole community instead of treating one patient). As the co-principal investigator of the project told us, the young scientists involved in the project in the 1970s were referred to as "young hooligans" who "took a big risk, because there was only scant evidence that blood pressure, cholesterol, and the use of tobacco might be the underlying factors [for heart disease]". The project team thought otherwise and felt it was obvious that clinical treatment of heart disease dealt with consequences rather than causes. It was not enough to work solely with "clinically high risk" individuals; a population-based approach was required. This meant changing general lifestyle patterns in North Karelia. In the 1970s, such a "community-based approach" was considered so radical that a 1973 editorial in the International Journal of Epidemiology denounced it as "shotgun prevention" (Oppenheimer et al., 2011) . The key form of institutional work included educating people about the relationship between lifestyle and heart health. Key channels of influence included discursive acts and "face-giving" by the project team in the local and national media. In the 1980s, the project hosted national risk-reduction TV shows, where special attention was given to infusing optimism and confidence.
Representatives of WHO and local medical doctors were invited to give testimony in local meetings in order to persuade the people to change their lifestyles. This was a strong form of disruption of institutions by questioning the moral foundations of existing eating habits and decreasing the perceived risk of the proposed lifestyle (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) . In motivational framing, attention was paid to emotional aspects deeply embedded in the local culture. Many North Karelians felt "I am in the project" (Puska et al., 2009: 286) , which was a powerful motivation for other people to join. Framing activities also involved legitimising the pioneering community approach among scholars.
Scientists as Midwives to Cluster Emergence 485 4.1.3 Bridging, networking and resource mobilisation. The key insight of the community approach was that an individual's behaviour cannot be changed simply by providing information; he/she needs to be persuaded to change his/her behaviour and be convinced that the new ideas are socially acceptable (McAlister et al., 1982) . An interdisciplinary approach that simultaneously applied medical, behavioural and social knowledge was used to design the process. Everett M. Rogers, the innovation diffusion theory guru, was involved in the project (see Rogers, 2003) . The key strategy was to use 800 lay opinion leaders, educated by a local NGO. At the same time, the project was linked with public administrative structures and health authorities, including local nurses and physicians. The key strategy in resource mobilisation was to make the project a national-level one with government involvement in order to secure long-term funding.
Authentic leadership.
The key designer of the North Karelia Project was Professor Martti Karvonen, a highly respected cardiologist. Karvonen understood that a deep societal transformation was needed among North Karelians, which required dedicated long-term leadership. Karvonen invited a young physician and social scientist named Pekka Puska to become the principal investigator of the project. Puska, then a 27-year-old public health physician, also had a master's degree in political science. He had been actively involved in student politics during the time of unrest in universities and believed strongly that highly entrenched institutions could be changed.
Authentic leadership meant that Puska and his young project team members devoted their full attention to fundamental change based on ideas hardly mentioned during their medical studies. It also required the ability to consider multiple sides of the issue as described by Puska:
The guiding principle was situational sensitivity-knowing really what others think, not what it looked like, but what it actually was. The other principle was that in your heart you understood that people were different . . . you needed to get everyone work in from their own starting points.
The young and inexperienced project team faced opposition and suspicion from many sources beyond scientific and grassroots communities, particularly from the National Farmers Union and the dairy industry. This was not surprising, given that the message to change from consuming butter and whole milk to margarine and fat-free milk was seen as a main threat to their business. Puska's political background was invaluable in breaking down the resistance, which also required persistence and frequent visits to the dairy farmers, local food manufacturers and retailers. Instead of blaming the farmers or the food industry, the project team challenged them to develop healthier food, thus paving the way to the concept of functional foods. Puska firmly believed in the importance of personal involvement what he called "boots-deep in the mud" philosophy. His guiding principle was to transfer knowledge from pure research to the daily life of people. The project's success was largely based on personal contacts and trust, as well as finding win-win situations for the participants. Besides his leadership tasks, Puska co-authored several hundred articles on the project. 4.2 Pre-emergence Phase: Innovating at the Interface between Industries, 1989-1995 4.2.1 Benecol story-brief overview. The public health efforts and the issue network created in North Karelia produced a fertile ground for deeper university-government-industry relationships, and for the development of health foods. In the late 1980s, a new vegetable oil was developed made of rapeseed, which grows well in the Finnish climate. In 1988, the firm Raisio began a research programme on rapeseed oil. Raisio invested heavily in a new pilot laboratory and factory, which became crucial in the development of cholesterollowering margarine Benecol, later selected as one of the top 10 food inventions in the world (Hyytinen et al., 2012) .
4.2.2
Bridging, networking and resource mobilisation. The development of Benecol started in 1986 based on a Finnish pulp and paper mill's need to find a suitable application and buyer for sitosterol, the surplus by-product of its milling process. The cholesterollowering effect of sitosterol had been identified in the 1950s, but the substance had poor solubility. The mill's plant manager contacted Professor Tatu Miettinen and his research group at the Helsinki University Central Hospital (HUCS), which had studied cholesterol metabolism for decades.
However, there was a considerable technical roadblock as there was no appropriate method to convert sitosterol in food. In 1989, Ingmar Wester, a chemist and R&D manager of Raisio, found the solution for converting sitosterol into a fat-soluble form. It is worth noting that at that time, Raisio had no ambition to create any functional foods business, but instead wanted to raise the image of its margarine segment. Raisio was particularly concerned about the expensive clinical trials needed. However, the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (TEKES) provided funding for the expensive clinical trials for the first time, so the Benecol project gained momentum.
While Miettinen was responsible for early clinical testing of Benecol at HUCS, a larger population trial was needed. When Wester inquired about the possibility of testing the cholesterol-lowering effect of Benecol within the North Karelia Project, Puska was immediately enthusiastic. Clinical trials were necessary not only to confirm the safety and efficacy of the product, but also to convince consumers, the medical community and, not least, the directors and stakeholders of Raisio to invest in the product (Hyytinen et al., 2012) . The positive results of the clinical trial were published in the New England Journal of Medicine (Miettinen et al., 1995) and received much attention. Raisio's deputy chief executive at the time told the New York Times: "It is like an atomic bomb we didn't mean to invent . . . We were just looking for a better margarine. We never thought it would be that big." 4.2.3 Authentic leadership: bridging the gap between epistemic communities. In this phase, the key form of institutional work was the merging of previously decoupled logics, namely those of medicine, pulp and paper, and food chemistry. Combining these logics required a wide competence base and the courage to look beyond disciplinary boundaries. It also required strong credibility as an altruistic scientist. Miettinen had devoted his life to medicine, scholarship and teaching and, as we were told, Miettinen worked for love, not for profit:
It [the perceived greed of medical doctors] can also destroy the whole thing . . . In the Benecol case, the personality of Tatu Miettinen was such that no one had anything against him.
Everybody knew that he only got a small lump sum for it [the invention] and no royalties afterwards.-Director of an industry association.
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The key scientists were not afraid to stake their credibility on building the market for functional foods. At the same time as the NEJM article was published, Benecol margarine was launched in Finland. A one-page advertisement included pictures of Professors Puska and Miettinen, with a headline asking: "Why do we recommend Benecol margarine for three out of four Finns?" (Lehenkari, 2003: 514) . This legitimation was highly appreciated by industry, as described to us by a sales director:
If I must name one key person, it is Pekka Puska, absolutely. That Finland has become a model country for functional foods and this kind of innovation hot spot is very much about Pekka Puska . . . Rather than blaming the food industry, he challenged the food industry to produce healthier foods. He created the motivation and need [for functional foods].
The example of Benecol encouraged the Finnish food industry to develop new functional food items on broad fronts. The concept also had an important indirect impact on the policy changes, by increasing public funding of industrial R&D and by triggering Finland's first technology programme in foods. 
Lock-in
The Finnish innovation environment-brief overview.
Since the 1990s, the concepts of industrial clusters and national innovation system have become key policy frameworks in Finland. In response to the economic crisis in the early 1990s, the government started to implement an endogenous, top-down planned, systemic innovation policy in order to restructure the economy away from excessive reliance on natural resources towards science-based R&D (Coenen and Asheim, 2006) . The National Industrial Strategy for Finland, published in 1993, redefined industrial policy along the lines of the Porterian industrial clusters (Ylä -Anttila and Palmberg, 2007) . This development saw the growing importance of TEKES; in fact, for three decades new technology programmes or activities have been introduced annually (Lemola, 2003; Brä nnback and Carsrud, 2008) . In the late 1990s, attempts at cluster formation around functional foods also magnified. While policy efforts made Finland a much-cited success story internationally due to intensive cooperation among universities, industry and research institutes, the attempts at cluster formation in functional foods faced severe challenges. Indeed, the period between the late 1990s and 2010 saw moves towards institutional consolidation of the infant functional foods cluster and the subsequent decline caused by mutually incoherent local agendas. 4.3.2 Resource mobilisation, networking and framing. When Finland joined the European Union in 1995, the market that had been protected by high import barriers was opened to international competition and the industry realised the benefits of joining forces. However, while cooperation between academia and industry was initiated, old inward-looking attitudes still persisted. This meant that, initially, ideas were not exchanged openly, differences in terminology of the industry and research hampered cooperation efforts, and there was minimal exchange of technology and know-how (Hyytinen et al., 2012) .
However, a more cooperative atmosphere was gradually created along with the use of positive motivational frames (e.g. "Silicon Valley of Functional Foods"). Continuing the work carried out by TEKES, SITRA launched another four-year cluster programme in 2004. One of the central aims of the programme was to establish a Strategic Centre for Science, Technology and Innovation in the field of food and nutrition in Finland. By late 2008, however, it became clear that the joint strategic research centre would not materialise. One explanation was that firms were unwilling to invest in something that transcended the boundaries of their own firms.
Authentic leadership: fighting entrenched mindsets
. "There is this old monopoly history, not-invented here syndrome, and a lot of inward looking" (Director of a Cluster Programme). "When firms get involved [in the cluster initiatives] they start to jealously protect their own interests . . . There is this inability to see beyond these traditional boundaries" (Chairman of the Board).
The unwillingness of firms to look beyond their boundaries and their disagreement on trajectories negatively impacted on the cluster formation (Garud and Ahlstrom, 1997; Garud et al., 2002) . There were also doubts about the efficiency of the cluster initiatives as described by an interviewee: "Along cluster initiatives a large amount of me-too products were financed . . . We've been the giving side in them". Overall, there seemed to be little authentic leadership apart from general optimism frames (e.g. Finland-a forerunner in healthy nutrition). We also found evidence that the move towards formalising the cluster was detrimental to its further development, as illustrated by this quote:
Every now and then they call and ask me to participate in these groups where they consider or brainstorm this and that-and I've refused politely. I've not bothered to participate, partly due to time pressure. But I'm very sceptical that in this way things will fly-concrete actions are needed in a natural way.-Managing Director.
Postscript.
Despite the setbacks, functional food actors continue to invest in creating new health-promoting innovations. Also TEKES considers whether to again set up a new technology programme, while also asking: "Should artificial respiration be stopped if the industry's willingness to invest is minimal?" (Hyytinen et al., 2012: 57) . The industry also sees potential in functional foods, even though the field has suffered from a slight downturn, corresponding to the European paradox, 1 where limited flow-through to economic development is achieved, despite relatively high R&D spending (Etzkowitz and Klofsten, 2005) . This development is in parallel with low entrepreneurial activity. While a closely knit community of professionals in functional foods has formed, it is populated by successful researchers who seemed to want to become even more successful researchers rather than 1 The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this comment.
Scientists as Midwives to Cluster Emergence 489 entrepreneurs (see also Brä nnback and Carsrud, 2008) . The individual scientists' institutional work, in itself, had not been sufficient to bring the cluster to the next level.
Discussion and Conclusion
We now return to our research question, "When scientists build new science-based clusters, what forms of institutional work are used in the process?" Table 2 compares the three phases of the narrative by analysing the institutional work performed by the scientists. It suggests that the scientists engaged in four broad forms of institutional work: ideational (framing and counterfactual thinking), material (resource mobilisation), bridging (bridging and networking) and authentic leadership.
Ideational, Material and Bridging Work of Scientists
The actual forms that institutional work took were closely related to the original triggers. While social and technological problems drove the developments in the first two phases, the last phase was triggered by competitiveness concerns. Consequently, it was necessary in the first two phases to exercise science-based counterfactual thinking and to create concrete and persuasive-even emotional-frames to mobilise actors in issue solving. In the first phase, institutional work furthered a paradigmatic change (Kuhn, 1962) and required a mindset close to Schumpeter's "creative destruction" (questioning established truths and counteracting prevailing practices). This necessitated a combination of micro-, meso-and macrolevel institutional work to secure cognitive, social and material support for the project. In the last phase, ideational and material work was more narrow, emphasising Silicon Valley rhetoric and channelling of government funding. National-level technology programmes were perceived as distant and conflict-prone, a finding that is reminiscent of Lorenzen's (2007) argument that the collective non-proprietary dimension of social capital often develops at spatial scales lower than the national scale.
Our findings emphasise the role of scientists acting as institutional entrepreneurs by bridging epistemic and disciplinary boundaries and bringing together hitherto disconnected organisations and individuals. While resembling previous accounts of bridging and networking processes of institutional entrepreneurs (Hung and Whittington, 2011; Tracey et al., 2011) , our analysis revealed a broader and differently phased institutional agency. Interestingly, the collaboration and legitimacy building identified started at the institutional level by allying with highly respected organisations such as WHO. This was required to defeat the strong scepticism present both at the grassroots level and in epistemic communities. While during the first two phases, institutional work took place in dialogue with the global science base, capitalising on the skills of scientists to work across the spatial scale (Ritvala and Granqvist, 2009) , the national technology programmes promoted few international links. Overall, the limited participation of international food companies in the Finnish cluster may partly explain the modest success in the cluster-building attempts (Mudambi and Swift, 2012) .
Authenticity: The Person behind Institutional Work
Our findings underline the role of institutional work of scientists in the form of authentic leadership. The successful phases of cluster emergence were strongly personified by a few scientists who orchestrated rebellious acts to change the shared disciplinary rules and conventions. However, while Puska enjoyed being in the spotlight, Miettinen and Wester were quite the opposite. Nonetheless, all of these individuals shared a common characteristic of being "in tune" with their basic nature (Avolio and Gardner, 2005: 319) ; that is, authentic to their inner missions and identities as scientists. Authenticity, the distinctive and truthful expression of identity to various audiences (Svejenova, 2005) , created legitimacy and encouraged others to join their missions. Different phases of cluster emergence seem to require the involvement of different types of personalities: from early radicals who identify issues, to hard-working scientists tackling a knowledge problem, to visionary leaders. Personal traits may also be connected to a peculiar role for scientists in cluster emergence of being an "icon". Icons are the "spiritual fathers" or institutional catalysts of clusters. Hecht (2008) argued that non-scientific attributes are the basis of the appeal of scientific icons. For example, Robert Oppenheimer has been portrayed as humanist, moralist, patriot, intellectual, adventurer or activist-something other than just a scientist. Gaining the status of icon makes it necessary to reveal a persona outside science in order for the individual to be admired as a scientist (Hecht, 2008) . Such symbolising does not include active agency, as previously discussed under the heading of institutional entrepreneurship. Icons also link clusters to more global developments through scientific and popular discourses, which affects the way in which a region projects its identity to both internal and external observers (Romanelli and Khessina, 2005) . Overall, our analysis has shown that scientists who act as institutional entrepreneurs can play key roles in sowing the seeds of new clusters. Eventually, however, this is not enough. Scientists are only able to act as midwives; the long-term survival of the cluster depends on the commitment made by private firms, which often requires institutional grounding in something beyond local profit rationales. This could partly explain why a surge of innovative activity within clusters is frequently followed by a collapse (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Pouder and St. John, 1996) .
Conclusion
This study responds to calls for a more nuanced understanding of how embedded actors may change institutions within geographically delimited spaces such as clusters (Casper and Kettler, 2001; Hung and Whittington, 2011) . The present study used the concept of institutional work, inspired by the sociology of practice (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) to understand how scientists framed, theorised and built new bridges through their everyday activities. While the study contributes to this stream of research by discussing the role of authentic leadership as a form of institutional work, it also contributes to the cluster literature by showing that not just anyone has the entrepreneurial ability and personal character to contribute to cluster formation.
The study raises some intriguing possibilities for future research. First, the important role of personal traits and inner motivations of institutional entrepreneurs challenges the rationalistic approach to institutional entrepreneurship by stressing the unplanned, highly personal and intuitive nature of institutional agency. More research is needed on the motivation and characters of institutional entrepreneurs. Secondly, our analysis revealed that the early gestation phase of cluster emergence was about mobilising a social movement to influence policy makers and business actors. This suggests an interesting avenue for Scientists as Midwives to Cluster Emergence 493 investigating further how social movements trigger the emergence of new clusters. Thirdly, we posit that problem-driven origins of clusters will become increasingly prevalent in the future; for instance, climate change and other major environmental threats have triggered the emergence of clean technology clusters. Such a problem-based approach opens new avenues in which to build good theories, which come from engagement with real problems of the world (Kilduff, 2006) .
